











Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, UK 
 
Laurence Alison 






*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr Nicola Power, Department of 






When presented with competing options, critical incident decision makers often struggle to 
commit to a choice (in particular when all options appear to yield negative consequences). 
Despite being motivated to take action in disasters, terrorism, major investigations and 
complex political interventions, decision makers can become inert, looping between phases 
of situation assessment, option generation and option evaluation. This ‘looping’ is 
functionally redundant when it persists until they have lost the opportunity to take action. We 
define this as ‘decision inertia’: the result of a process of (redundant) deliberation over 
possible options and in the absence of any further useful information. In the context of critical 
incidents (political, security, military, law enforcement) we have discovered that rather than 
disengaging and avoiding difficult choices, decision makes are acutely aware of the negative 
consequences that might arise if they failed to decide (i.e., the incident would escalate). The 
sensitisation to possible future outcomes leads to intense deliberation over possible choices 
and their consequences and, ultimately, can result in a failure to take any action in time (or at 
all). We (i) discuss decision inertia as a novel psychological process of redundant deliberation 
during crises; (ii) define the concept and discuss the emerging studies in support of our 
tentative hypotheses regarding how the cognitively active process of deliberation can result in 
complete behavioural inactivity; and (iii) suggest recommendations and interventions for 
combatting inertia. 






Decision Inertia in Critical Incidents 
Although the world has faced numerous political, social and psychological challenges 
across centuries (e.g., first and second world wars), the challenges faced by Europe (and 
indeed the globe) in the 21st century continue to grow. From the displacement of millions of 
refugees from war torn countries who have sought solace throughout Europe, to the 
instability caused by Brexit and the increase in right-wing extremism and isolationist 
ideologies, to the ever-increasing reality of terrorism as a constant threat; Europe is in a state 
of dynamic and uncertain change. Regardless of political or ideological viewpoints, this 
creates a challenge for policy makers and scientists alike, who must react and anticipate these 
changes whilst implementing actions to try and mitigate instability to a dynamic series of 
fluctuations across Europe and its relationships more widely. This paper will outline the 
importance of psychological research to help strategic decision makers implement choices 
despite instability, uncertainty and risk. This could include emergency responders reacting to 
a terrorist attack, political parties responding to the migrant crisis, or nation states 
deliberating over the Brexit deal. All these choices are characterised by uncertainty, 
conflicting information and opinions, and a limited opportunity to claw back consequences 
once actions have been set in place (irreversible decisions). Importantly, choices are typified 
by a tendency for significant delays or failures to take action due to prolonged, albeit 
redundant, deliberation; a process we term ‘decision inertia’. 
This paper makes a novel contribution to psychological theory by extending the 
research on the psychology of doing nothing (specifically doing nothing even in the face of 
significant external stimuli). Whereas a plethora of research has explored and tested the 
relationship between stimulus and response, relatively little research has studied the 
relationship between stimulus and non-response. As explored in the philosophical ‘Buridan’s 
ass’ paradox, wherein a donkey who is equally thirsty and hungry dies when placed between 
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hay and water since it cannot make a distinguishable choice, we are interested in what 
happens when someone needs to behave, but is unable to act. ‘Decision inertia’, a term 
originally coined by Alison et al. (2015), was used to describe the process of redundant 
deliberation over a choice for no positive gain1. Alison et al.’s (2015) paper focused 
principally on describing the authors’ experiential observations of working with police, 
security and military with regards to decision derailments during critical incidents, presenting 
an example from a large scale live simulated exercise involving a plane crash. However, the 
paper provided little detail on defining, unpacking or exploring the conditions under which 
decision inertia occurred, or the psychological mechanisms that underpinned it. This paper 
provides a descriptive account of the psychological process of decision inertia and, with 
reference to the limited literature that has explored non-decision-making, outlines five 
hypotheses to test it empirically. 
Decision inertia is a stimulus–non-response activity that, we argue, is poorly 
understood, under researched, and presents a methodological challenge. With regards to 
methods this is largely due to the fact that the majority of current methodological approaches 
are directed at measuring the presence of a given behaviour rather than the possible processes 
underpinning non-behaviour. Unlike decision avoidance, which describes inaction as a result 
of suspended disengagement with decision processing, decision inertia reflects behavioural 
inaction despite cognitive processing, and has been observed in the context of critical 
incidents (e.g., Power & Alison, 2017). Decision inertia is characterised by redundant 
deliberation; the constant rumination over possible choices in the absence of further useful 
information. It is a cognitively active process that involves the decision maker (unhelpfully) 
modelling prospective future states that do not assist him / her in taking action (e.g. what 
																																								 																				
1 Note: This is distinct from the definition of ‘decision inertia’ as a sub-optimal tendency to 




happens if things go wrong? What happens if I change my mind?). Take Buridan’s ass: is she 
more likely to defer her choice by disengaging with the problem, or is she more likely to be 
engaged in intense deliberation about how to resolve her paradox? 
 
The context of decision inertia: critical incidents 
A decision is defined as a commitment to a course of action that is taken in order to 
achieve a desired goal (Yates, 2003). Making a decision requires that we operate on the 
environment, commit to an option and initiate behaviours directed at teleological goals. 
Merely thinking about a problem does not reflect a choice. Equally, thinking and choosing, 
but not acting, is insufficient. The hallmark of a ‘good’ decision is to wait until we have all 
available information to derive accurate inferences (Plous, 1993). Effective decision-making 
includes the ability to anticipate and prospectively model future states and consequences of 
action, as it motivates individuals to identify the steps required to reach a desired goal 
(Karniol & Ross, 1996). Individuals who score highly on measures for ‘consideration of 
future consequences’ and ‘episodic future thinking’ (i.e., they tend to think about future 
states) are less likely to procrastinate (Rebetez, et al., 2016), which suggests future thinking 
stimulates action. Yet, many important decisions are underpinned by ambiguous, incomplete 
or contradictory information, meaning that our capacity to make rational choices is bounded 
by the environment and cognition (Simon, 1956). In such instances, mental forecasting and 
deliberation about what we might do could be counterproductive: when should mental 
forecasting stop? Sometimes it is important to hold back to maximise outcomes – other times 
it may be prudent to take a least worst first approach. What dictates the appropriateness of 
these decision maxims is the decision context.  
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Decision inertia as a concept emerged from the authors’ real-world observations of 
decision-making and decades of ethnographic experience of research in critical incident 
settings; where decision-making was degraded not by making the wrong choice, but by 
delaying or failing to make any decision at all. It appears typical in contexts whereby: (i) 
choices are multi-attribute; involve (ii) one-time, irreversible consequences; (iii) in dynamic 
environments; where (iv) anticipated negative consequences are not only linked to action but 
also to inaction. The Boxing Day Tsunami (2004), the Haiti Earthquake (2010) and the 
ongoing refugee crisis in Europe are all incredibly diverse and emotionally salient 
emergencies that have one thing in common: the failure of authorities to take timely action 
(Grunewald, Binder & Georges, 2010; National Audit Office, 2006; UNICEF, 2008). The 
emergency response to the devastating Haiti earthquake was criticised for being slow due to 
weak humanitarian leadership (Grunewald, et al., 2010) and poor prioritisation of relevant 
information (Patrick, 2011); uncertainty concerning roles, responsibilities and leadership 
were blamed for causing delays in the response to widespread flooding in the UK (Pitt, 
2008). Consider also the decision faced by President Obama and the United States 
Government with the eruption and escalation of violence in Syria:  
“Do nothing, and a humanitarian disaster envelops the region. 
Intervene militarily, and risk opening Pandora’s box and wading into 
another quagmire like Iraq. Send aid to the rebels, and watch it end up in 
the hands of extremists. Continue with diplomacy, and run head first into a 
Russian veto. None of these approaches offered much hope of success”. 
Clinton (2014, p.461) 
Critical incidents are contexts in which individuals and teams make judgements whilst 
operating under rapidly changing and uncertain conditions (Militello, Sushreba, Branlat, 
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Bean & Finomore, 2015). They are high-stakes, severe consequence, highly ambiguous and 
unpredictable events (Alison & Crego, 2007), characterised by missing and conflicting 
information (Bharosa, Lee & Janssen, 2010) and exacerbated by time pressure (Chen, 
Sharman, Rao & Upadhyaya, 2008) and damage to organisations (Alison and Crego, 2007). 
They place huge demands on the physical, psychological and interpersonal skills of the 
decision maker (Orasanu & Lierberman, 2011), contributing to cognitive overload and stress 
(Paton & Flin, 1999). A qualitative analysis of interviews with Emergency Service 
commanders highlighted how decision makers were not only driven by a desire to avoid 
causing poor outcomes through action, but were equally concerned about the negative 
consequences that might arise should they do nothing, tied to their role being in ‘command’ 
of the emergency (Power & Alison, 2017): option A might be bad, option B might be worse, 
but the option of doing nothing at all might actually be worst of all. Decision inertia is 
characteristic of critical incidents as negative consequences do not only arise from poor 
choices, but can also arise if one fails to take any action at all (i.e., situation worsens). 
How is decision inertia distinct from other theories of ‘non-decision-making’? 
In an early attempt at exploring the concept of non-decision-making, Anderson (2003) 
wrote a seminal paper on the study of ‘decision avoidance’. He described avoidance as “a 
pattern of behaviour in which individuals seek to avoid the responsibility of making a 
decision by delaying or choosing options they perceive to be nondecisions” (p.139, 
Anderson, 2003). He identified choice deferral (“I’ll put this off until later”), status quo bias 
(“I’ll just copy what everyone else does”), omission bias (“I choose to do nothing”) and 
inaction inertia (“I have missed a previous better opportunity, so I’ll wait and see if a better 
one arises”) as four decision avoidance effects. Crucially, decision avoidance reflected 
disengagement with the decision process.  
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Decision inertia extends Anderson’s (2003) model by identifying a fifth type of non-
decision-making characterised by a desire to commit to a choice; thereby not disengaging 
with the decision process, but engaging in effortful cognitive deliberation even when no 
further useful information is forthcoming. This extends Anderson’s (2003) proposed 
antecedents to decision avoidance, where he argued anticipated regret/blame and selection 
difficulty lead to avoidance via, for example, choice deferral. We argue that when decisions 
are made in time critical contexts wherein the opportunity to implement a choice can be lost 
(e.g., patient dies whilst deliberating between options) that there is a fifth component to the 
psychology of doing nothing: continued cognitive deliberation until the opportunity to decide 
has passed. As with Buridan’s ass, the decision maker is neither avoiding nor deferring the 
decision, but is constantly ‘leaping’ from one set of options to the other, to the point where 
the ‘reward’ for all the effort and deliberation between hay or water is death. 
Related to inertia is work from the motivational literature – specifically with regards 
to the actual sequence of processes within a decision. For example, Gollwitzer’s (1999) work 
(e.g., Aschziger & Gollwitzer, 2007; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) on the model of action 
(or Rubicon model) identified four action phases underpinning decision-making: 
predecisional (deliberation between goals); postdecisional (implementation of goals via 
behaviour); actional (behavioural action); and postdecisional (review of goals and behaviour). 
He argued that the distinction between pre- and postdecisional phases is based upon the type 
of mindset used by the individual making a choice. Specifically, predecisional phases are led 
by deliberative mindsets (i.e., what to do?) whereas postdecisional phases are led by 
implemental mindsets (i.e., how to do it?). A critical point in transitioning from pre- to 
postdecisional mindsets is by forming a goal intention to direct behaviour. It is possible that 
decision inertia occurs when individuals are unable to identify a clear goal intention, thus 
inhibiting transition from deliberative to implementational mindsets. 
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Similarly, Kalis, Mojzisch, Schweizer and Kaiser (2008) have described why people 
failed to act despite their intention to behave. They identified how intentions can be derailed 
during: (i) option generation (due to loss of goal directedness); (ii) option selection (due to 
impulsivity, compulsivity and ambivalence); and (iii) action initiation (due to motor 
difficulties and hyperactivity). Our notion of ‘decision inertia’ builds upon this model to 
identify how behavioural intentions can be derailed through redundant deliberation, which 
interferes with the entire decision-making process (Figure 1). Decision makers fail to 
progress to action as they oscillate between situation assessment, option generation and 
option evaluation, all whilst trying to trade off the potentially adverse negative prospective 
modelling of future states that arise from both taking action and not taking action (‘what will 
this look like if I do A?’ / ‘what will this look like if I don’t do A?’).  
Decision inertia is thus a cognitively demanding, but ultimately self-defeating, 
process of redundant deliberation over future states in the absence of any new or useful 
information. It is not decision avoidance, which reflects a choice to disengage with decision 
processing (Anderson, 2003). Decision inertia emerges from continuing in perpetuity about 
the choice, rather than choosing to ignore it. It incurs significant cognitive load. Decision 
inertia is not an adaptive process related to ‘sensemaking’. Thinking and cognitive effort 
alone are insufficient for action and impact. Decision makers must consider whether it critical 
to act now or in the near future. If time is available, then they can search for more 
information and think more; if time is limited, they must be vigilant to the diminishing 
returns for further thinking. Indeed, previous research has shown a hallmark of expertise is 
the ability to accurately assess timelines (i.e. when to act) (Hoffman Ward, Feltovich, Di 
Bello, Fiore and Andrews, 2013) and experts have been found to rapidly detect and correct 
errors during problem solving (Patel, et al., 2011). Finally, decision inertia is not 
implementation failure (i.e., failure to execute action, despite cognitive commitment to an 
RUNNING	HEADER:	DECISION	INERTIA	
	 10	
option). Implementation failure has been explored in organisational settings; wherein poor 
team structure, a lack of organisational cohesion and ineffective team management have all 
been associated to action failure (Decker, Durand, Mayfield, McCormack, Skinner & Perdue, 
2012; Taleai & Mansourian, 2008). Decision inertia precedes the point of implementation 
failure as a choice is yet to be made.  
Hypothetical factors that might contribute to decision inertia 
We provide a descriptive model of decision inertia (Figure 1). It outlines how 
intentions can sometimes fail to produce action due to a process of redundant and continued 
deliberation during situation assessment, option generation and option evaluation. It 
illustrates how uncertainty and the anticipation of potential negative consequences underpin 
redundant deliberation. Crucially, it incorporates the context of the choice, by asking whether 
the decision maker can choose to do nothing; if so, they can avoid choice, if not, they return 
to redundant deliberation. Five hypothesised contributory factors to inertia are outlined 
below. Although this list is not exhaustive, it provides an initial basis upon which to develop 
further research on decision inertia. We suggest that, despite the methodological challenges 
for measuring inertia – the absence of behaviour – that empirical studies could be designed to 
test: (i) the time spent deliberating over choice; and (ii) physiological measures to detect 
arousal (and not disengagement) during this process. By designing studies wherein there is no 
clear or objective right or wrong answer (e.g., pick the red or blue pill), inertia can be 
measured by seeing how long for and how aroused participants remain despite there being no 
reward for cognitive processing; specifically, via manipulation of variables outlined in our 
five hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Decision inertia will increase when information about the decision 
problem is ambiguous. Decision inertia is more likely to occur when information about the 
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decision problem is ambiguous (Ellsberg, 1961) leading to uncertainty. This may occur when 
there is not enough information, or when there is too much information as decision makers 
struggle to process relevant pieces of information (Bharosa et al., 2010; Power & Alison, 
2017). Take the decision triggered by Brexit on free movement of people: policy makers 
might have multiple and conflicting information about how their choice will influence 
migration figures across Europe, whilst very little information on how their choice will affect 
societal and cultural harmony. Furthermore, an ‘obsession with full information’ has been 
identified as an ‘avoidable pathology’ during high-stakes events such as emergencies (Boin & 
t’Hart, 2010). When available information about potential options is complex, deliberation 
might increase as individuals struggle to disentangle options, especially when they are unsure 
of acceptable choice thresholds (Chen, Ma & Pethtel, 2011; White & Hoffrage, 2009). In 
contexts where decision avoidance is possible, individuals can opt to disengage with 
cognitive processing; yet when a decision is required, we argue that decision makers will 
redundantly deliberate in an attempt to reduce uncertainty, even when there is little chance of 
additional information helping their choice. 
Ambiguity derails choice because it limits the decision maker’s confidence in their 
ability to accurately make sense of the situation and prospectively model future states (Klein, 
Snowdon, & Pin, 2007; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; van den Heuvel, Alison & Crego, 2012). 
An informed understanding of the decision environment enables the decision maker to 
anticipate consequences and distinguish between courses of action. However, when a 
situation is ambiguous, it can increase the perceived risk associated with the consequences for 
choices and potential regret, decreasing action likelihood (Anderson, 2003). Importantly, 
when making high-stakes choices wherein negative consequences can also arise for doing 
nothing (i.e., as the situation will get worse), then redundant deliberation might occur in 
attempts to trade off risk between action and inaction. In managerial settings, it was found 
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that task ambiguity and risk led to implementation failure (Brooks, 2011; Decker et al., 
2012); yet in contexts where inaction is equally aversive, decision makers are unlikely to 
disengage. Ambiguity is hypothesised to contribute to decision inertia by increasing 
redundant deliberation to try and resolve uncertainty and avoid negative consequences.  
Hypothesis 2: Decision inertia will increase when there is social or team 
uncertainty. Decision inertia will increase when operating in social or team-based settings 
where there is ambiguity about the team structure. Alison, Power, van den Heuvel and 
Waring (2015) explored police decision-making in a simulated hostage negotiation incident 
and found that feelings of uncertainty were not only associated with task ambiguity, but arose 
due to social ambiguity (e.g., poor understanding of roles within the team network). Police, 
Fire and Ambulance commanders must make decisions as a coordinated team by relying on 
information from one another; yet, the mere presence of others creates uncertainty as 
individuals make their own choices whilst monitoring those of others (van Harreveld, van der 
Pligt & Nordgren, 2008). Individuals operating in team settings are five times more likely to 
defer their choice than when the same decision problem is given to individuals (White, et al., 
2011). In contexts where choice deferral is not an option, it is anticipated that the presence of 
others will increase decision inertia. Indeed, decision inertia could explain the ongoing 
prolonged and redundant deliberation over the Brexit deal (despite no new information 
arising), which is exacerbated by the sheer number of European partners involved whose 
roles and responsibilities for decision-making lack clarity.  
Issues of trust in team settings might also influence decision inertia. A culture of 
mistrust can increase redundant deliberation as individuals consider whether they can trust 
the information they have received from others rather than focussing on the task (Alison et 
al., 2015; Bond & Nolan, 2011; Mamhidir, Kihlgren & Sorlie, 2007). When working with 
disliked others, individuals anticipate more regret for making a wrong choice (Kumar, 2004), 
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which may increase redundant deliberation in order to avoid regret. People try to avoid 
deciding when they anticipate potential negative feedback from others about their choices 
(Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 1997). This could involve the salience of anticipated loss (Crotty & 
Thompson, 2009), the anticipation of blame (Eyre, Alison, Crego, & Mclean, 2008, 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead & van der Pligt, 2000), and the perceived inability to 
personally justify choice (Beeler & Hunton, 1997; Brooks, 2011; Dhar, 1997). Thus, social 
ambiguity related to trust in the team network can contribute to decision inertia, as 
individuals redundantly deliberate over the trustworthiness of information rather than 
focussing on the decision task to try and avoid potential negative outcomes.  
Hypothesis 3: Decision inertia will increase when managing conflicting or 
contradictory goals. Decision inertia will arise when a task involves multiple contradictory 
and conflicting goals. For example, European states deliberating over the refugee crisis might 
feel conflicted between humanitarian goals to support displaced refugees against nationalist 
goals to protect the resources of their nation state. Goals are important for decision-making as 
they help to orient and motivate behaviour in pursuit of desired outcomes (Locke & Latham, 
1990). Different types of goals have been found to have different effects on behaviour. For 
example, ‘avoid goals’ (to avoid negative outcomes) are associated with increased 
deliberation on a choice as individuals try and avoid potential negative consequences for 
acting (Corr & McNaughton, 2012); whereas approach goals (i.e., when one seeks to achieve 
positive outcomes) are associated with increased action implementations (Elliot, 2006). 
However, approach goals can be maladaptive when it is difficult to trade off equally 
attractive outcomes (Boyd, Robinson, & Fetterman, 2011) and decision-makers feel unable to 
justify their choice (Dhar, 1997; Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz & Simonson, 2007). This is 
linked to ‘maximising’ (i.e., select the best possible outcome) wherein decision-makers use 
‘alternative-based’ cognitive processing strategies to judge if any options are good enough, 
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increasing their tendency to focus on subjectively meaningful attributes and raising their 
threshold of acceptance (Parker & Schrift, 2011).  
Although goals can be useful to guide behaviours, vague goals can derail behaviour 
by contributing to uncertainty (Locke & Latham, 1999). Goals can be vague when multiple 
goals compete with each other, making it difficult to identify which goal to prioritise at that 
point in time. In an exploratory study on decision inertia in Emergency Response 
Commanders, it emerged that decision inertia seemed to occur when commanders struggled 
to trade-off approach goals to ‘save life’ with avoid goals to ‘prevent harm’ (Power & Alison, 
2017). The authors suggested that commanders redundantly deliberated because they feared 
violating both these goals; wanting to take action due to their organisational responsibility, 
but also wanting to avoid action due to the (unintentional) risk of negative outcomes as a 
result of action. More recent research (Shortland & Alison, 2017) has observed these effects 
as a function of competing ‘sacred’ values. In military contexts, armed forces were more 
likely to engage in redundant deliberation when forced to choose between two sacred military 
values such as ‘protect my own men’ vs. ‘complete the mission’. It is argued that decision 
inertia can be stimulated by calculating a set of sacred values and forcing individuals to 
choose between them. The more sacred the competing values, the more prone to decision 
inertia.  
Hypothesis 4: Decision inertia will increase in those who are less experienced in 
the choice context. Domain-specific experience facilitates decision-making since individuals 
are able to rapidly process the choice environment and generate solutions to difficult 
problems (Klein, Calderwood & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). The more experienced an individual 
is, the less likely they are to perceive risk or experience dread associated with choice (Bond 
& Nolan, 2011). Experience enables people to process their choice efficiently, even when the 
task is objectively complex (Bornstein, Emler & Chapman, 1999; Braverman & Blumenthal-
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Barby, 2012); for example, an experienced police officer responding to a terrorist incident 
will be better able to manage their stress levels than a member of the public as they have 
more knowledge about the choice context. Experts have relevant task-specific knowledge 
(Stanovich & West, 2008), which allows them to use ‘gut instinct’ and intuition (Klein, et al., 
1986); relying upon accurate implicit and explicit ‘recognition primed’ mental models, 
developed through repeated exposure in the choice environment (Klein, 2008; Roswarski & 
Murray, 2006). It was found in the fire service that experienced commanders were more 
likely to progress to action implementation following plan formulation, whereas novices were 
equally as likely to return to situation assessment again (Cohen-Hatton, Butler, & Honey, 
2015). Experience is predicted to reduce decision inertia as experts use intuitive and learned 
responses and are better able to adapt to the time demands of the situation and judge when 
deliberation must stop and a decision must be made. 
Interestingly it has been found that the effect of deliberation as a processing style on 
decision quality is moderated by experience. One study found that both novices and experts 
made no worse or better (respectively) choices when asked to deliberate on their choice; 
however, the performance of ‘intermediates’ (those who had experience, but only modest 
knowledge about the specific task context) degraded following deliberation (Dijkstra, van der 
Pligt & van Kleef, 2013). This suggests that those with experience, but limited experience 
applying this knowledge to the given task domain, perform worse following deliberation. 
This might explain why inertia has been observed in emergency contexts. The decision-
maker is experienced in their role, but they may be less experienced in applying this 
knowledge to the specific intricacies of an unpredictable emergency incident, which could 
induce perpetual deliberation. It might be useful to train decision-makers to sensitize them to 
an awareness of when deliberative stopping rules should be applied, to improve the 
usefulness of deliberation during time pressured emergencies. Shortland, Alison and Moran 
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(in press) have shown that military personnel seem to be relatively less susceptible to 
decision inertia than other groups and have suggested this may be a function of having more 
experience of bad outcomes and greater tolerance of least worst choices.  
Hypothesis 5: Individual differences in ‘decisiveness’ traits will predict the 
likelihood of decision inertia. A final hypothesis is that decision inertia will be more 
prevalent in those with indecisive personality traits. Personality research has identified how 
certain individuals possess traits that can influence the way that they process decisions 
(Brooks, 2011). When asked to choose between options, trait ‘indecisive’ individuals tend to 
use maladaptive cognitive processing styles that systematically compare all alternatives 
whilst utilising extremely high thresholds of acceptance (Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007). 
They fail to make a choice as they try and find the perfect option (i.e., are any options good 
enough?). This decision-making strategy would be undesirable during complex decision 
tasks, such as Brexit, wherein objective ‘right’ outcomes are highlight unlikely to emerge. 
Alternatively, ‘decisive’ individuals use adaptive attribute-based search patterns to select a 
compromise option from those that are available (i.e., which option is the best?). ‘Indecisive’ 
individuals might be predisposed to redundant deliberation and inertia. Likewise, high scores 
on ‘state-orientation’ (i.e., a tendency to focus on negative emotions and ruminate on past) as 
opposed to ‘action-orientation’ (i.e., a tendency to focus on the present task) is associated 
with greater rumination on emotions as opposed to the decision task (van Putten, Zeelenberg 
& van Dijk, 2009), and those high on ‘need to compare’ (i.e., tendency to engage in social 
comparisons with others) often struggle to make decisions as they redundantly deliberate over 
social comparisons rather than the decision task (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2005).  
Other traits associated with delayed decision-making include: ‘desire for control’ (i.e., 
desire to maintain control over decision outcomes) (Thomas, Buboltz, Teague & Seeman, 
RUNNING	HEADER:	DECISION	INERTIA	
	 17	
2011); ‘outcome sensitivity’ (i.e. motivation to avoid post-decisional feedback) (Dholakia, 
Gopinath & Bagozzi, 2005); ‘neuroticism’ (Wong, Yik & Kwong, 2006); and trait 
‘avoidance’ (versus approach) motivations (Corr, DeYoung & McNaughton, 2013; Harmon-
Jones Harmon-Jones & Price, 2013). Those personalities that are associated with indecision, 
can be collectively described as reflecting poor cognitive flexibility; as they are unable to 
adapt to the demands of the problem environment and instead engage with continued 
deliberation in line with their (inappropriate) values (Roskes Elliot, Nijstad & De Dreu, 
2013). Thus, indecisive individuals are expected to show greater decision inertia as they have 
a chronic disposition for redundant deliberation. Further research is needed to unpack how 
individual differences in cognitive processing styles and personality interact with the 
tendency for inertia.  
Possible solutions to reduce decision inertia 
Whilst it is important that researchers study the processes that underpin decision 
inertia, it is equally important that researchers also seek to develop solutions to reduce its 
effects. This is particularly important in terms of having impact on the European and world 
stage, by helping critical decision makers better cope with uncertainty in high-stakes 
environments. One possible solution that we would like to highlight is decision-making 
training; specifically, to assist decision makers with structuring the way in which they process 
information in complex contexts. The ability to make sense of and evaluate information to 
select that which is useful (and equally reject that which is not) comes from experience; 
however, experience takes time to build.  
One solution might be via the development and use of scenario-based learning and 
immersive simulated environments to support deliberate practise and feedback (Alison et al., 
2013; Colvin Clark, 2014). There are also approaches that may help decision makers with 
RUNNING	HEADER:	DECISION	INERTIA	
	 18	
especially complex and multi-source information sources that some have suggested provide a 
useful cross check on the perception of what matters; such as Analysis of Competing 
Hypotheses, which encourages decision-makers to weigh alternative explanations of 
conclusions (Heuer, 1999). Training interventions might also include multi-team exposure, so 
that individuals are better able to process information and make decisions due to knowledge 
of the team structure, and training could further be developed to help decision-makers better 
manage their goals and expectations of when and where an inertia ‘trap’ is likely. Thus, we 
argue that research is first needed to better understand the conditions under which decision 
inertia might arise, but we caveat that such research must be crucially supported by insight on 
how to reduce its effects in these applied environments. In practitioner domains, this can be 
via the development of training or new policies and procedures to help critical decision-
makers navigate their choices. 
Conclusion 
Psychologists have developed considerable expertise in helping us to understand the 
links between environment, behaviour and human cognition by experimenting on and 
observing the relationship between stimulus and response. But there has been limited 
attention paid to understanding the relationship between stimulus and non-response. This is 
important in a 21st century Europe and across the globe, where decisive action regarding 
migration, political unrest and terrorism is needed more than ever. This paper has taken a first 
step in clearly defining, identifying and highlighting the concept of decision inertia as a 
process that might explain why strategic decision-making can derail. Decision inertia is not 
an adaptive form of sensemaking (“I am still discovering the facts about my available 
options”); it is not decision avoidance (“I choose not to decide for the time being”); and it is 
not implementation failure (“I have made my choice but the translation of my choice into 
action has failed”). Decision inertia is a process of failing to take action due to constant and 
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redundant deliberation about the problem (“I am still thinking about whether I will commit 
to, refuse or avoid my choice”). It results in behavioural freezing caused by intense cognitive 
deliberation, despite there being little or no chance of further information alleviating efforts. 
There are both conceptual and methodological challenges for researching the absence of 
behaviour; yet the benefits for tackling these challenges are huge, spanning from theoretical 
knowledge to real-world impact that might help us to manage a changing Europe. 
Fundamentally, this paper has hoped to stimulate psychological enquiry so that we can more 
fully understand the psychological processes that don’t only explain why people make 
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